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Abstract—Nowadays, IoT devices have been widely deployed
for enabling various smart services, such as, smart home or e-
healthcare. However, security remains as one of the paramount
concern as many IoT devices are vulnerable. Moreover, IoT
malware are constantly evolving and getting more sophisticated.
IoT devices are intended to perform very specific tasks, so their
networking behavior is expected to be reasonably stable and
predictable. Any significant behavioral deviation from the normal
patterns would indicate anomalous events. In this paper, we
present a method to detect anomalous network communications
in IoT networks using a set of sparse autoencoders. The proposed
approach allows us to differentiate malicious communications
from legitimate ones. So that, if a device is compromised only
malicious communications can be dropped while the service
provided by the device is not totally interrupted. To characterize
network behavior, bidirectional TCP flows are extracted and
described using statistics on the size of the first N packets sent
and received, along with statistics on the corresponding inter-
arrival times between packets. A set of sparse autoencoders is
then trained to learn the profile of the legitimate communications
generated by an experimental smart home network. Depending
on the value of N, the developed model achieves attack detection
rates ranging from 86.9% to 91.2%, and false positive rates
ranging from 0.1% to 0.5%.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Neural Network, Anomaly
Detection, Internet of Things, Network Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The total number of IoT devices is expected to reach 75
billion by 2030 [1]. This rapid adoption of IoT introduces
new security challenges [2] [3] for network administrators.
Most IoT devices are vulnerable because of a lack of security
experience of the manufacturer and a short time to market. The
devices present many security flaws, such as weak passwords,
backdoors and various software vulnerabilities [4] [5] [6].
Most vulnerabilities are not even properly patched because of
a poor software update policy or a lack of security awareness
of the end user. From 2016 to 2017, there was a 600 percent
increase in IoT attacks [7]. In 2016, Mirai turned thousands of
smart devices into bots. Those infected devices were primarily
used to perform DDoS attacks [8]. Mirai performed brute-
forcing to infect poorly configured devices. Since Mirai, IoT
malware have considerably evolved and are getting more and
more complex. In 2017, the Reaper IoT botnet was mainly
exploiting disclosed vulnerabilities to infect devices [9]. In
2018, HideNSeek has become the first IoT malware capable of
surviving a device reboot [10]. To cope with these permanently
evolving threats, new anomaly detection methods need to be
developed, especially designed to deal with the huge diversity
of IoT devices.
In this context, machine learning can be leveraged to de-
velop techniques to detect malicious activities in IoT networks.
An IoT device is intended to perform very specific tasks that
remain the same over time. For example, a smart bulb can only
be switched on or off. However, it is not supposed to send
emails or click on ads, making its behavior very stable and
predictable. On the contrary, the main difficulty encountered in
applying data analysis techniques for intrusion detection in the
case of general purpose devices, such as desktop computers,
laptops or smartphones, is the great variability and diversity of
the generated network traffic [11]. The versatile nature of the
network traffic generated by general purpose devices makes it
difficult to define what behavior is supposed to be legitimate.
Therefore, anomaly detection methods are, thus, better suited
for IoT devices.
In this paper, we present a method to detect anomalous
communications in IoT networks. Communications detected
as being anomalous can be dropped while the legitimate
communications are maintained. Such a model, that identifies
and blocks only anomalous connections, will allow a device to
provide services even if it is infected by a malware. We pro-
pose to take advantage of a set of sparse autoencoders to learn
the legitimate communication behavior of the IoT network.
Due to the great diversity of IoT devices (camera, smart bulb,
motion sensor, etc), the network communications behavior
can vary greatly from one device to another. Therefore, one
different sparse autoencoder is trained for each IoT device
type. However, during the testing phase (or actual deployment
phase), we assume that it might not be possible to determine
what device the network communications belong to. Hence,
we feed the network communications data to all the trained
sparse autoencoders. A communication is considered to be
anomalous if all the trained sparse autoencoders consider so.
We set up an experimental smart home network composed of
four IoT devices to generate legitimate network traffic data.
Bidirectional TCP flows are then extracted. Features used to
describe the bidirectional flows are statistics on the size of978-1-7281-2522-0/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Sparse Autoencoder
the first N packets sent and received, as well as, statistics
on the inter-arrival times between those packets. Depending
on the value of N, the developed model achieves an attack
detection rate between 86.9% and 91.2%, and a false positive
rate between 0.1% and 0.5%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes how to use sparse autoencoders to perform anomaly
detection. In Section III, we describe our model and the
features that we use. Section IV describes the data used to
train and test the model. Then, in Section V we present the
experimental results. Section VI reviews the related works.
Finally, Section VII concludes and presents the possible future
works.
II. SPARSE AUTOENCODERS FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Sparse Autoencoder
Autoencoders are unsupervised artificial neural networks
that learn to copy their inputs to their outputs under some
constraints. The constraints are added at the hidden layer.
They force the autoencoder to learn an efficient representation
of the input data. Sparsity is such a constraint. In sparse
autoencoders [12], the number of neurons in the hidden layer
is usually greater than the number of inputs as shown in Figure
1. Sparsity is added by forcing the autoencoder to reduce the
number of active neurons in the hidden layer. A neuron is
considered to be active if its output is close to 1 and inactive
if its output is close to 0. For example, one can constrain
the autoencoder to have on average 1% of significantly active
neurons in the hidden layer. To do so, first, the average
activation of each neurons in the hidden layer is computed.
Then neurons that have on average an activation greater than
the targeted activation are penalized by adding a sparsity loss
term to the cost function. The contribution of the sparsity loss
term to the total cost function is controlled through a sparsity
weight parameter.
The difference between the input and the output is called
the reconstruction error. Let xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn) be the
output of the autoencoder when fed with a specific input
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Then the reconstruction error RE is
given by:
RE =
∑
(xˆi − xi)2
During the training phase, the parameters of an autoencoder
are optimized in order to minimize the reconstruction error for
a particular dataset. Once trained, if the autoencoder is fed with
data that are similar to the data used during the training phase,
the reconstruction error will be small. On the contrary, the
reconstruction error will be large when test data are different
from the data used during the training phase.
B. Detection Threshold Determination
The reconstruction error RE can be used as a measure of
the outlierness of new samples. To use an autoencoder as an
anomaly detector, a detection threshold has to be fixed. The
detection threshold is the value of the reconstruction error
above which an instance is considered as being anomalous.
The detection threshold is determined using a validation
dataset that is different from the one used for training. The
detection threshold thr is calculated as follows:
thr = µ(REV al) + σ(REV al)
where µ(REV al) is the mean reconstruction error over
the validation set and σ(REV al) the corresponding standard
deviation. Extreme outliers are removed before calculating the
detection threshold. Extreme outliers are any validation sample
for which the reconstruction error is greater than two times the
total number of features (2n). Indeed, we can prove that if the
reconstruction error is greater than twice the total number of
features then the autoencoder is performing worse than random
guessing.
Proof. Let Xi be a random variable that model the distribution
of the ith feature of the input data. As the data are normalized
before being fed to the autoencoder, Xi follows a normal
distribution centered to 0 and with unit variance Xi ∼ N(0, 1).
Let Xˆi be a random variable that model the ith feature of
the output vector. Let us consider that we randomly guess
the value of each feature of the output vector from a normal
distribution centered to 0 and with unit variance, that is,
Xˆi ∼ N(0, 1). Then the error on each individual feature is
given by:
E[(Xi − Xˆi)2] = V ar(Xi − Xˆi) + E[Xi − Xˆi]2 =
V ar(Xi) + V ar(Xˆi) + Cov(Xi, Xˆi) + 0 = 2
where E, V ar and Cov stand for the expectation, the variance
and the covariance respectively. As the overall reconstruction
error is equal to the sum of the error on each feature, we end
up with a reconstruction error equal to 2n.
In other words, if we randomly guess the value of each
feature of the output vector from a normal distribution N(0, 1),
then on average the reconstruction error will be equal to 2n.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
A. Overview
We propose to detect anomalous communications in IoT
networks using a set of sparse autoencoders. Figure 2 shows
Fig. 2. Proposed anomalous communications detection architecture using a
set of sparse autoencoders (SAE)
the proposed architecture. First, network communication data
are preprocessed to extract useful features (descibed in Section
III-C). The preprocessing step also include features normal-
ization. The normalized data is then fed to multiple sparse
autoencoders. Indeed, for each IoT device type present in the
network, one different sparse autoencoder has been trained
to learn its legitimate communication profile. Next, a decision
module takes the outputs of all the sparse autoencoders and de-
termine whether a communication is anomalous or not. Finally,
the role of the mitigation module is to block communications
detected as being anomalous.
B. Decision Module
One different sparse autoencoder is trained to learn the
profile of the legitimate communications for each IoT device
type present in the network. By IoT device type we refer to
a device model from a specific manufacturer. We assume that
during the testing phase (or actual deployment phase) it is
not possible to know what device is generating the ongoing
network communications. Therefore, the data describing each
communication are fed to all the trained sparse autoencoders.
A communication is considered as being anomalous only if all
autoencoders consider so. Formally, let us consider a total of
T different IoT device types. Hence, the communication data
are fed to T different sparse autoencoders. The reconstruction
errors on the output of each autoencoder are calculated and
compared to their respective detection thresholds to deter-
mine whether the communication is anomalous or not. Let
{A1(x), A2(x), ..., AT (x)} be the set of decisions obtained
for the T sparse autoencoders when fed with input x, with
Ai : Rn 7→ {0, 1} the decision of the sparse autoencoder
trained to learn the legitimate network communication profile
of the ith device type. It takes as input a network commu-
nication x from the feature space Rn and output 0 if the
communication is legitimate and 1 if it is anomalous. Note
that we assume that for each IoT device type present in the
network, there exists an autoencoder that has been trained
to learn its legitimate communication profile. Let x be the
network communication being tested. It is fed to all the trained
sparse autoencoders. The final decision anomaly is given by:
anomaly =
⋂T
i=1Ai(x)
where anomaly is equal to 1 if the communication is
anomalous. Note that the communication is considered to
TABLE I
FEATURES USED TO DESCRIBE BIDIRECTIONAL TCP FLOWS
Features
Mean, Median, Min, Max, Standard deviation and Count
of the size of the first N packets sent
Mean, Median, Min, Max, Standard deviation and Count
of the size of the first N packets received
Mean and Standard deviation
of the IAT between the first N packets sent
Mean and Standard deviation
of the IAT between the first N packets received
be legitimate if at least one autoencoder considers so. The
advantage of doing so is that we no longer need to know the
type of IoT device that generated the network communication
beforehand. Indeed, depending on where the detection system
is located it can be difficult to find out the type of IoT device
that generated the traffic. For example, when the devices
communicate through a NAT proxy and the detection system
is located outside the local network.
C. Features Description
Network traffic data are preprocessed in order to extract
bidirectional TCP flows identified by their source and des-
tination IP addresses and ports. A timeout is used to split
long TCP connections into multiple bidirectional flows. The
features describing the bidirectional TCP flows are statistics
on the size of the first N packets sent and received, along with
the corresponding inter-arrival times (IAT). The features are
described in Table I.
Count stands for the number of packets among the first
N packets that have a non-zero size. In other words, it
corresponds to the actual number of packets sent or received.
It can be less than N because of the timeout used to split long
TCP connections. For example, if the total number of packets
sent for the duration of the timeout is equal to some value less
than N, then count is equal to that value. Otherwise, it is equal
to N. For the IAT to exist, N should be equal or greater than
2. Note that if a communication contains only one packet sent
or received, the statistics that cannot be calculated, such as,
the mean and standard deviation of the IAT between packets,
are all set to 0.
The features used to describe the network traffic are appli-
cation agnostic. Any application can run on top of the TCP
protocol. Note that the features can be extracted even if the
network communication is encrypted. The size of packets and
IAT have been successfully used in other IoT related works
[13] [14] [15]. Our study focuses only on TCP protocols as
all the devices used for experiments use HTTP/HTTPS for
communications. This makes sense as most of the network
communications generated by IoT malware use TCP [7].
However, the proposed method can be easily extended to UDP
communications.
IV. DATASET DESCRIPTION
To train and test the model, one need three different datasets:
a training set, a validation set and a test set. The training set
TABLE II
TOTAL NUMBER OF BIDIRECTIONAL FLOWS PER DEVICE
Bidirectional flows
D-Link Motion Sensor 1074
Nest Security Camera 1055
TP-Link Smart Bulb 1040
TP-Link Smart Plug 858
Total 4027
is used to optimize the parameters also called the weights of
the neural network. The validation set is used to fine tune
the hyperparameters of the model, namely, the learning rate,
the number of epochs used for training (early stopping) and
the decision threshold (described in Section II-B). Both the
training and validation sets only contain legitimate network
traffic data as they are used to learn the normal communication
profile. The test set is used to assess the performance of the
developed model and it contains both legitimate and malicious
network traffic data.
A small smart home network is set up to generate legitimate
network communications. The experimental smart home con-
sists of four IoT devices: a Nest security camera, a D-Link
motion sensor, a TP-Link smart bulb and a TP-Link smart
plug. Network traffic has been collected for a total of 7 days.
Table II shows the total number of bidirectional TCP flows
extracted for each device.
Malicious bidirectional flows used in the test set are ob-
tained from IoTPOT [16], an IoT honeypot designed to get
infected by IoT malware. A total of 46,796 bidirectional
TCP flows are extracted from one day of network traffic
data. The collected network traffic data represents network
traffic generated by IoT botnets. Note that the number of
malicious bidirectional flows is much larger than the number
of legitimate ones. This is not an issue as the malicious flows
are only used during the testing phase to assess the attack
detection rate.
V. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
As described in Section III-B, one sparse autoencoder per
device is trained to learn the legitimate communication profile.
The architecture of each sparse autoencoder for our experiment
is as follows:
• The size of the input layer is 16 (equal to the number of
features)
• The size of the hidden layer is 32
• The target sparsity is equal to 0.1
• The sparsity weight is equal to 0.2
We train and test the model for different values of N (in-
troduced in Section III-C) ranging from 2 to 10. For example,
if N is equal to 5, the statistics described in Section III-C, are
calculated over the first 5 packets sent and received. To get the
best out of the limited number of legitimate communication
samples, we perform 5-fold cross-validation. That is, the set of
collected legitimate communications is split into 5 folds. The
sparse autoencoders are trained using 4 folds (that actually
consists of the training set and the validation set as described
in Section IV) and the remaining fold is used as the test set.
The process is repeated 5 times, with each of the 5 folds used
exactly once as the test set.
B. Achieved Performance
The true positive rate (also called recall or attack detection
rate) and the false positive rate are used to assess the per-
formance of the model. Let TP , TN , FP and FN be the
number of true positive, true negative, false positive and false
negative respectively. The true positive rate (TPR) and the
false positive rate (FPR) are given by the following formula:
TPR = TPTP+FN
FPR = FPFP+TN
To assess the performance of the overall model, the test
data is fed to all the sparse autoencoders and the final decision
is obtained following the method described in Section III-B.
Figure 3 shows the achieved TPR and FPR for different
values of N. TPR oscillates between 86.9% and 91.2%. The
TPR reaches the maximum for N equal to 3. That is, looking
at more packets than the first 3 packets sent and received no
longer improve the TPR. As for the FPR, it ranges from
0.1% to 0.5%, depending on the value of N. FPR tends to
increase as N goes up. This can be explained by the presence
of legitimate samples in the test set that behave more like
outliers above a certain value of N. For example, if the size
of the first 6 packets of a communication are stable and in
accordance with what was learnt by the model to be legitimate
then it will be correctly classified as being legitimate by any
model trained for a value of N less or equal to 6. But if
that same communication has the size of its 7th sent packet
unduly small or large, then some features such as the mean
size of the first 7 packets sent will be greatly affected. As
a consequence, models trained for a value of N greater than
or equal to 7 will misclassify this same communication as
being anomalous. Hence, once a legitimate communication
has been misclassified as being anomalous by a model trained
for a specific value of N, it is very unlikely for that same
communication to be correctly classified by a model trained
for a greater value of N. This is why FPR tends to increase
with N.
VI. RELATED WORK
Few works about machine learning for IoT network intru-
sion detection exist. In [14], stacked vanilla autoencoders are
used to detect compromised devices in a network. However,
the work does not aim to separate malicious communications
from legitimate ones, but only to detect whether or not a device
is infected. The work presented in [17] takes advantage of
the temporal periodicity of traffic generated by IoT devices
to detect compromised devices. They use Gated Recurrent
Units with a detection threshold. In [18], the authors use an
autoencoder to detect anomalies in the data read by the nodes
of a Wireless sensor network (WSN). Other works leverage
Fig. 3. Achieved TPR and FPR for different values of N
supervised machine learning. In [19], a set of features is
defined to describe MQTT, DNS and HTTP protocols. An
AdaBoost ensemble learning algorithm, composed of three dif-
ferent machine learning models, is developed to detect attacks.
In [15], supervised machine learning is used to perform DDoS
attack detection in consumer IoT networks. Other works focus
on leveraging machine learning to fingerprint IoT devices in a
network [13] [20] [21] [22]. The purpose of IoT device type
fingerprinting is to detect devices that are considered to be
vulnerable in order to deny access to the network.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper introduced a method to detect anomalous com-
munications in IoT networks using a set of sparse autoen-
coders. One different sparse autoencoder is trained to learn
the legitimate communication profile of each IoT device type
present in the network. The features used are statistics on
the size of the first N packets sent and received, along with
statistics on the inter-arrival times between the packets. We
set up an experimental smart home network to assess the
performance of our model. Depending on the value of N, our
model achieved attack detection rates ranging from 86.9% to
91.2% and false positive rates ranging from 0.1% to 0.5%.
Once a communication is detected as being anomalous it can
be dropped without having to totally interrupt the service
provided by the device.
For future works, our model should be tested with a network
that contains a larger number of IoT devices. One should
also consider the case of a general purpose network that
contains not only IoT devices but also personal computers
or smartphones. Adversarial machine learning can also be
leveraged to assess the robustness of our proposed model. We
are also planning to integrate the developed anomaly detection
model in a Software Defined Networking (SDN) environment
in order to provide centralized monitoring and management of
multiple IoT networks.
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